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Do democracies experience an increased risk of terrorist attacks when an election draws near?
Deniz Aksoy presents results from an analysis of terrorist attacks in western European
democracies between 1950 and 2004. She writes that while there is evidence that terrorist attacks
increase in the lead up to elections, this is only the case in countries where marginalised groups
ﬁnd it diﬃcult to inﬂuence the political process, such as in states with high electoral thresholds for
representation in parliament.
On 11 April 2015 in Agri’s Diyadin district near the Turkish-Iranian border, a clash between Turkish
security forces and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is deﬁned as a terrorist group by NATO and several
other western countries, left ﬁve militants dead and four soldiers wounded. It was two months before the upcoming
legislative elections in Turkey. Following the event, many commentators and oﬃcials accused the PKK of trying to
derail the elections.
Deputy Prime Minister Yalc ̧ın Akdoğan underlined the connections between the attack and the upcoming elections
and argued that the PKK was trying to pressure the electorate. Similarly, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu noted that
an earlier attack by the terrorist group DHKP-C on the Istanbul courthouse that killed a prosecutor on 31 March and
the attack in Diyadin were not randomly timed; they both aimed to inﬂuence the elections.
Policy-makers in many other democracies often raise similar concerns over the connections between terrorism and
elections. For example, following a deadly attack by Basque group ETA only a month before the 2008 Spanish
general elections, then Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero said: “The terrorists have today tried to interfere in the
peaceful manifestation of the will of the people at the polls”.
The above examples raise an interesting question: Do approaching elections lead to an increase in the volume of
terrorist activity in democracies? In a recent study, I illustrate that approaching elections are not always associated
with an increase in the volume of terrorist activity. Electoral permissiveness, a central feature of democratic electoral
systems, determines the extent to which approaching elections lead to an increase in the volume of violence.
Elections and terrorism in democracies
Even though all democracies provide their citizens with peaceful opportunities to inﬂuence politics, some provide
marginalised groups easier access to the political system than others. Some democracies have very permissive
electoral institutions, which rely on highly proportional representation electoral formulas and low electoral
thresholds. High levels of electoral permissiveness make it easier for a wide range of political actors, mainstream or
marginal, to enter electoral competition. Thus, permissive electoral institutions can help channel discontented
actors’ activities to the peaceful arena of electoral competition.
However when electoral permissiveness is low, it is harder for marginalised discontented actors to meaningfully
participate in elections. For example, if the electoral system imposes a high electoral threshold (such as the 10 per
cent threshold in Turkey), a small political party formed by marginal groups does not have much chance of gaining
legislative representation. Consequently, while approaching elections and increasing competition motivate
discontented actors to increase their activities, obstacles they face to enter electoral competition pushes these
actors to violent means.
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Therefore in democracies with low electoral permissiveness, increased competition around elections combined with
low levels of electoral permissiveness increases incentives to use violent tactics. Accordingly, approaching elections
lead to an increase in the volume of terrorist attacks only in democracies with low levels of electoral permissiveness.
Electoral permissiveness and terrorist attacks
Using data from Western European democracies between 1950 and 2004 and statistical models that include
country ﬁxed eﬀects, I show that approaching elections are linked with an increase the volume of attacks in
democracies with the least permissive electoral systems, but not in countries with permissive electoral systems.
In Figure 1, I illustrate the relationship between the number of months to an election, the eﬀective threshold, which is
a measure of electoral permissiveness, and the predicted number of terrorist attacks. A move from 60 to 0 on the x-
axis indicates that elections are approaching. A move from 10 to 30 on the y-axis indicates an increase in eﬀective
threshold, thus a decrease in electoral permissiveness. Figure 1 shows that when the threshold is at low levels,
approaching elections are not associated with an increase in the expected number of attacks. However, at high
levels of threshold, approaching elections are positively associated with an increase in the volume of attacks.
Figure 1: Relationship between terrorist attacks, time to election, and electoral permissiveness
Note: For more information see the author’s article in The Journal of Politics.
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Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between approaching elections and the predicted number of attacks in three
diﬀerent scenarios: when threshold is at its minimum value (.7), maximum value (35), and set to 31. The vertical
dashed line indicates when the diﬀerences in predicted number of attacks across the three scenarios are statistically
signiﬁcant. Whenever there are less than 28 months to elections, the diﬀerences in predicted number of attacks
across the three scenarios are statistically signiﬁcant. Negative slopes of the black dashed lines suggest that when
threshold is high, decreasing the number of months to elections is associated with an increase in the number of
attacks.
Figure 2: Relationship between upcoming elections and predicted number of terrorist attacks in three
diﬀerent scenarios
Note: For more information see the author’s article in The Journal of Politics.
Accordingly, in the least permissive systems, approaching elections are likely to be associated with an outburst of
attacks. When the eﬀective threshold is 35, the predicted number of attacks 6 months before elections is 4.05 and it
increases to 4.39 in the month of elections, holding all the other variables at their mean values. This is around an 8.3
per cent increase in the volume of attacks. However, if the eﬀective threshold is 31 then the predicted number of
attacks 6 months before elections is 2.99 and it increases to 3.17 in the month of elections. This is around a 6 per
cent increase in the volume of attacks.
Thus, as the threshold increases the inﬂuence of approaching elections becomes more dramatic. This is evident
from the slope of the short-dashed line being steeper than the slope of the long-dashed line. The slope of the solid
line is positive, even though it is not steep. This suggests that in countries with very low thresholds, approaching
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elections lead to a slight decrease in the predicted number of attacks. However, based on the calculations of the
marginal eﬀect of approaching elections, this eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant. In fact, only when the eﬀective
threshold is above 30 are approaching elections signiﬁcantly related to an increase in the volume of attacks.
Overall, this empirical analysis shows that approaching elections are not consistently associated with an increase in
the volume of domestic terrorist attacks. Among the democratic countries studied, only in those with the least
permissive electoral institutions are approaching elections associated with an increase in the volume of attacks.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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